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ETHICAL intuitionists may be described as holding that certain ethical 
terms stand for characteristics which are indefinable and non-natural. In 
twentieth-century literature this claim has been made primarily for the 
term "good" in the usage in which it is short for "intrinsically good," 
whereas it had previously been made mainly for such words as "right," 
"ought," and "fitting." Now, the arguments to prove that "good" (in the 
sense of "intrinsically good") stands for an indefinable characteristic have 
been frequently, if not definitively, discussed; but those to show that it 
stands for a non-natural characteristic, so far as they are distinct from the 
former, have not, to my knowledge, been dealt with at all. It is, therefore, 
my purpose to take up these latter arguments here and to show that they 
quite fail to prove their point. 
When  they say that goodness 1 is a non-natural characteristic, the intui- 
tionists mean to say one or more of three things: (a) it is nonempirical, 
(b) it is in a certain sense consequential or resultant, (c) it is in some way 
nondescriptive. 2 Thus it is one or more of these statements that they are 
trying to establish when they contend that goodness is non-natural. C. D. 
Broad, for instance, describes a non-natural property as one the concept 
of which is nonempirical, and argues as follows to show that goodness is 
non-natural in this sense, if it is a property at all. a (1) It seems evident 
that goodness is not a characteristic of which we become aware by inspect- 
ing our sense-data. (2) It seems equally clear that goodness cannot be 
identified with any simple psychological characteristic such as we could 
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discover by introspecting our experiences; no one who is tempted to identify 
it with one of these psychological characteristics will do so if he recognizes 
the distinction between goodness itself and a good-making characteristic. 
(3) Therefore, if goodness is a simple quality, then it is "almost certainly" 
non-natural. (4) But no proposed definition of goodness in purely natural 
terms is in the least plausible. (5) Therefore, if goodness is a complex char- 
acteristic, then again it is almost certainly non-natural. (6) Hence, finally, 
if there is such a characteristic as goodness at all, then, "according to our 
criterion," it will almost certainly be non-natural. 
Probably no one except an extreme behaviorist will question step (1). 
But very many writers would object to step (4), and, in view of the num- 
ber of able men among them, it seems hardly reasonable to assert that no 
proposed naturalistic analysis of goodness is in the least plausible. It would 
be reasonable to say that no such analysis of goodness is correct, but  this 
Broad does not show. In step (2) Broad is similarly dogmatic. If enioyable- 
ness is a simple psychological characteristic, it is not obvious to me, at any 
rate, that (intrinsic) goodness cannot be identified with any such char- 
acteristic; one could, at any rate, identify goodness with enjoyableness and 
still admit the distinction between goodness and good-making character- 
istics, just as Broad himself admits the distinction between pleasantness 
and pleasant-making characteristics. But even if it is true that goodness 
is not identical with any "other" simple psychological characteristic like 
enjoyableness, it is by no means clear that it is not an indefinable (simple 
and unique) natural characteristic of an introspectable sort. Merely to 
affirm that it is not such a characteristic is to beg the question. On the 
other hand, to assert that inspection reveals goodness not to be on the 
list of introspectable characteristics may be correct, but it involves admit- 
ting that the issue is to be settled by inspection and not by argument, and 
that what purported to be an argument consisting of six steps was really 
only an appeal to inspection--which I believe to be the case. 
I confess that upon inspection I do not find any indefinable natural 
property for which the term "good" might be taken to stand when it is 
used in the sense in which Moore and Broad are interested. Hence I 
share Broad's opinion to the extent of agreeing that, if goodness is a prop- 
erty which is indefinable in natural terms, then it is almost certainly non- 
natural (in his sense, at least).4 But I must insist that the antecedent of 
this hypothetical proposition has not been sufficiently well established 
(certainly not by Broad in the discussion here in question) for anyone to 
proceed to the assertion of its consequent. 
Miss Clarke suggests an argument to show that goodness is non-natural 
in Broad's sense when she contends that, if goodness is a resultant prop- 
erty, then it would seem that it must be nonempirical. 5 This contention is 
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somewhat cryptic and hypothetical. Suppose we agree that goodness is a 
resultant property. In which sense? In the Moore-Ross sense? ° Even in 
that sense, "P is resultant" does not logically entail "P is nonempiricat." 
To get this conclusion we must add the premise, "No empirical property 
is resultant (in the sense in question)." This premise, however, cannot be 
asserted until it is known that goodness is not an empirical property. It 
may be true that, if P is resultant in the Moore-Ross sense, then it is not 
identical with any of the "other" properties which we call empirical (and 
this only follows if none of these properties is resultant in that sense); this 
would mean that P is not definable in empirical terms, but  it does not 
follow that P is nonempirical. 7 
Perhaps Miss Clarke means that there is no natural resultant property 
for which "good" can plausibly be said to stand, so that, if it stands for a 
resultant property, it must stand for one which is non-natural. Then I can 
only say that it is not clear, and she does not show, that there is no natural 
resultant property (definable or indefinable) which "good" may be said 
to denote, or that "good" does denote a property which is resultant (in 
the Moore-Ross sense, at least). 
In his recent reply to his critics, G. E. Moore seems to take a non-natural 
property to be one which is nondescriptive (in a sense not further speci- 
fied), and he offers what he calls a "good" argument to show that good- 
ness is non-natural in this sense. 8 The argument, he says, contains two 
premises; actually, as I understand it, it contains several more, and runs 
as follows. (1) There are many different natural intrinsic properties which 
are ought-implying. ° (2) No natural intrinsic property (except possibly a 
disjunction of them all) is both entailed by all of these properties and 
ought-implying. (3) Goodness is not identical with each of these different 
natural intrinsic properties. (4) It is entailed by each of them. (5) It is 
not identical with a disjunction of them all. (6) It is ought-implying. 
(7) Therefore, goodness is not identical with any natural intrinsic property. 
Moore says that this argument is perfectly conclusive if (1) and (2) 
are true. This is obviously a slip on his part. It is conclusive only if premises 
(3) to (6) are also true. But of these premises only (3) is unquestionable. 
Premise (4) would be denied by those who regard goodness as not being 
intrinsic in Moore's sense, (5) involves the assumption that "good" in 
the sense of "intrinsically good" is not an ambiguous term, and (6) was 
once denied by Prichard and Carritt. However, there may still be good 
reasons for supposing these additional premises to be true, and I do not 
wish to question them. Nor am I concerned here to deny (1). Wha t  I 
wish to contend is that in asserting (2) Moore is so far from giving us a 
"good" argument as to be begging the question. To assert (2) one must 
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know that goodness is not a natural intrinsic property which is both ought- 
implying and entailed by all the natural properties referred to in (1). 
To know this one must know: (a) that goodness is neither a natural 
property nor a disjunction of natural properties, (b) that it is not entailed 
by all the natural properties referred to in (1), or (c) that it is not ought- 
implying. 
Now (b) and (c) are ruled out by (4) and (6) respectively. There- 
fore, if one asserts (4) and (6), then before he can assert (2) he must 
know (a). Now (a) does not follow from (4) and (6) taken separately 
or together, for, as Moore  admits, a natural intrinsic property may be 
resultant and ought-implying. Therefore, to know (a) one must know in- 
dependently that goodness is not a natural intrinsic property. Hence, to 
assert (2) in conjunction with (4) and (6) is to assume that goodness is 
not a natural intrinsic property, and so to beg the question. 
A. C. Ewing has also contended that goodness is non-natural (in Broad's 
sense apparently), 1° but  I have dealt with his arguments elsewhere. 11 His 
main point is that the notion of goodness involves that of obligation and 
is therefore generically different from all natural notions. This, however, 
assumes that "good" is definable in terms ,of "ought" and that "ought" 
stands for a non-natural characteristic; his other arguments do not establish 
either of these assumptions, any more than they prove directly that good- 
ness is non-natural. In fact, in order to make his point, Ewing appeals, not 
to any argument, but to inspection. "I see," he says, "that propositions 
about what is good in some senses of 'good' are propositions which cannot 
be analysed adequately in psychological terms. ''12 This is as it should be, 
for inspection, if I am right in my estimate of his and other intuitionists' 
arguments, must in some sense be the ultimate court of appeal in this 
matter. Even so, his appeal to this tribunal is rather too facile, and others 
may well, on consulting it, receive a negative verdict, as I do (except in 
the ease of moral value). 
However, my concern here is with the arguments which are alleged to 
prove that goodness (intrinsic) is non-n~itural, and I believe I have shown 
them to be quite inconclusive or even question-begging. Hence, if careful 
inspection bears us out, we may still be naturalists about intrinsic value. 13 
Of course, these arguments cannot serve to establish the non-naturalness 
of moral value, rightness, or obligatoriness either, if I am right. This result 
is not entirely to my liking, as I am still inclined to be a non-naturalist 
about these. But, if one is to be a naturalist about intrinsic value, as I find 
myself being, one must answer said arguments, and, anyway, if they are 
in fact inconclusive or question-begging, nothing is to be gained by hiding 
this. As A. N. Prior has recently said, it is only confusing the issue for 
non-naturalists to go on misconceiving the grounds of their position. 14 
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I SHOULD like to be allowed to reply briefly to the criticism of myself which 
is the main burden of Paul Edwards' paper on "Ordinary Language and 
Absolute Certainty" in your January issue. 
The  particular argument he attacks is one which I used in the course 
of an a t tempt  to refute Norman Malcolm's theory that the disagreement 
between the philosopher and the plain man about  the "certainty" of some 
material object statements is merely a disagreement about  the use of lan- 
guage. 1 I sought to show, against Malcolm, that the ordinary usage of the 
phrase "known for certain" and the philosophical usage are in fact one 
and the same, namely, "known in a way which excludes all possibility of 
doubt";  and that the plain man's disagreement with the philosopher about  
